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APPLIED PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 
AND INSTITUTIONAL RELIGION: 
THE METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
In the last several years, philosophical enthusiasm for applied profes­
sional ethics has spread from medicine to law, education, government, 
engineering, business, and to other professional and semiprofessional 
fields. Each involves an institutional structure within which professional 
practitioners provide specific services to those who seek them, and within 
which practitioner behavior in providing these services is regulated by both 
formal and informal institutional codes and conventions. Recent work in 
applied ethics has forced reinspection o f these codes and conventions and of 
the moral features o f the professional practices they govern—from client 
confidentiality to the exchange o f fees—and has revealed characteristic 
dilemmas and conflicts which are endemic to these areas of professional ac­
tivity. Indeed, in some cases— for instance, in the de-paternalization o f 
medicine—the inquiries of applied professional ethicists have begun to pro­
duce quite striking changes in professional practice itself.
But there remains one area o f institutional practice which has not yet 
come under the scrutiny o f contemporary applied professional ethics: this is 
the provision o f religious services, or, more generally, the institutional prac­
tice of religion. In this exploratory paper, I’d like to do two things: first, to 
show that because religious practitioners are in many important ways like 
professionals in other fields, we may expect their practices to generate the 
same sorts o f issues discussed in other areas o f applied professional ethics; 
and second, to consider the special methodological problems analysis o f 
these moral issues might present.
Religious Practice as Profession
Vigorous recent debate over whether religious practice is a profession 
has produced both optimism and alarm: while some observers praise a 
heightened sense o f professional identity in the ministry, others view in­
creased professionalism as incorporating the worst features of modern 
Managerial society.1 Perhaps the whole of the ministry cannot be captured 
in a characterization o f it as a profession, but at least many features o f it 
can be described in this way, and this will provide a starting-point for the 
Questions o f professional ethics that we wish to ask. It is o f course true that 
the clergy—indeed, the class of religious practitioners generally—are not a 
homogeneous group, unlike, say, the members of the legal profession, but
rather include a quite heterogeneous collection o f priests, ministers, rabbis, 
and pastors, associated with a variety o f denominations. It is also true that 
the boundaries of the profession are not very clear, since while it is quite 
plausible to treat the mainstream clergy as professionals, the characteriza­
tion becomes increasingly strained the further out one moves into the fringe 
sects and cults. Such differences aside, however, there are a number of 
remarkably close parallels between religious practitioners and the profes­
sional o f other institutions, sufficient not merely to regard institutional 
religious practice as a profession, but to invite critique by the applied pro­
fessional ethicist.2
First, the secular professions are characterized by a requirement of 
training and credentialling before prospective practitioners are admitted to 
practice; the professions do not allow amateur practice. Similarly, in the 
mainstream religious groups, training for admission to the clergy may be 
quite extended, involving in most cases a number o f years o f postgraduate 
or seminary training. This often includes specific educational requirements, 
such as the study o f Latin, Hebrew and other biblical languages, or training 
in pastoral counseling. The clerical candidate may be required to pass 
special examinations, or to produce (as for admission to the Bar) special 
recommendations o f character, and the course o f study culminates in the 
award o f a degree. In some religious groups, particularly the cults or new 
religions, such training does not resemble academic or scholarly study, but 
rather involves an extended period o f apprenticeship or discipleship before 
such titles as “ master” are conferred and the individual assumes an 
authoritative role in the community. Nevertheless, particularly in the 
mainstream denominations where sustained formal schooling does result in 
the award o f a degree, training and credentialling practices for the clergy 
strongly resemble those o f the secular professions, and thus, we may expect, 
give rise to similar sets of moral problems. Is the training appropriate for 
the services to be rendered, for instance, and are the entry criteria for ad­
mission to training unbiased? Does the credential awarded serve as a 
reliable indicator o f specific training or skills? While these questions may 
not initially seem to be profound ones, examination o f them will reveal 
some quite provocative issues, as would similar investigation in fields like 
education or medicine.
Admission to institutional practice takes place with credentialling* 
usually known in the mainstream religious groups as ordination. Typically 
accomplished in a discrete, identifiable ceremony, ordination serves as 
licensure for practicing the rites and performing the services offered by that 
group. (This credential is not usually transferable from one group t0
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another; the ordained Episcopal priest is not thereby licensed to perform, 
say, Catholic religious services, although in the present spirit o f  
ecumenicism he or she may be invited as a guest to participate in services 
common to both.) After ordination and assumption o f a professional role, 
the practitioner or provider o f religious services is usually readily dis­
tinguishable from recipients of those services, often on the basis o f distinc­
tive behavior, grooming, or clothing. Typically, the practitioner’s church or 
religious group provides him or her with employment; it develops codes of 
conduct governing practitioner behavior (these may be informal or explicit, 
or both); it enforces malpractice standards and disciplines the practitioner; 
and to greater or lesser degree it controls the practitioner’s methods and 
standards of practice. The practitioner, in return, gives his loyalty to the in­
stitution; he supports it in his public activities, and announces himself as a 
representative of it. In large measure, he derives his identity from his role 
within this institution. He supports the ends o f this institution, and regards 
furtherance of this institution as among his own goals.
But inasmuch as the religious practitioner resembles other professional 
practitioners in functioning within an institutional setting, he is likewise 
confronted with similar moral problems, particularly involving conflicts 
between his obligations to the institution and his obligations to his clients. 
Are his primary obligations to promote the welfare o f his particular 
parishioners, or to protect and augment the church? Ought he support the 
institutional church in policies he in conscience believes wrong, or engage in 
whistleblowing on other members of the clergy he views as corrupt? Does he 
incur special obligations to a religious group in virtue o f his employment 
within it, and if so, what are they? Similar issues arise in medicine, educa­
tion, government, engineering, business, and the law, and in each o f these 
areas, as in religion, such conflicts can be very acute.
In addition, the relationship o f the religious practitioner to the recip­
ients of his services is much like that of the practitioner/client relationship 
in many other professions. In general, religious practice more closely 
resembles the consulting professions than the scholarly professions: the 
clergy provide an identifiable service to specific clients. Usually, the 
religious practitioner has direct contact with the recipients, both in groups 
(“congregations” ) and on an individual basis. Depending on the group and 
on the proportion of pastoral vs. ceremonial practice involved, the services 
rendered by the practitioner may be either relatively uniform or highly in­
dividualized to the needs and desires of the specific client. Some religious 
fcroups also involve offices or roles perhaps analogous to the scholarly pro­
fessions—e.g., those with monastic orders or those which encourage in-
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dependent theological research; often, though, these functions are less em­
phasized and less conspicuous than the much more numerous direct service 
functions the institution fulfills.
Relationships involving direct contact between practitioner and client, 
whether preaching, counseling, officiating at rites, or other functions, are 
as in other professions typically characterized by inequalities of authority 
and power. Indeed, the medical practitioner, as with the religious practi­
tioner’s authority and power over the client may in many cases be extreme. 
O f course some religious practitioners exploit this fundamental disparity 
with abuses o f  authority like manipulation, invasion o f privacy, sexual 
harassment, and the like, but the more interesting issues concern the institu­
tion as a whole. Does the institutional structure o f religious practice itself 
inherently produce disparities in authority, power, and status, and do 
specific activities it expects o f  its practitioners contribute to this? Are there 
ways in which individual practitioners might counteract this effect? Is client 
autonomy desirable at all in religious settings, or are inequalities o f authori­
ty and power defensible if used for paternalistic ends?
The relationship between religious practitioner and recipient of services 
is characterized by another feature central to the professions: the recipient 
of services is the financial supporter o f the institution and, with it, of the 
practitioners it employs. In both law and fee-for-service medicine, the 
economic relationship between practitioner and recipient of services is in its 
simpler forms direct: the client or patient pays the practitioner for those 
specific services which he receives. In some forms of religious practice, this 
relationship also appears to be quite direct: the believer in a healer’s tent 
may contribute immediately to the preacher for the healing performed, or, 
more often, in order that it shall be performed. In the so-called 4‘electronic 
church” contributions to the practitioner may also be direct and identified 
as associated with specific services, e.g ., for broadcasting at a certain hour. 
Even in the mainstream Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish groups the of­
ficiating practitioner accepts a tip for performing specific services or rites 
such as baptisms, ritual circumcisions, and marriages (but not funerals); 
although most mainstream religious professionals are salaried. Differences 
between fee-for-service and salaried practice may generate a number of 
compelling moral questions, including those concerning the quality of ser­
vice and access to services for those who cannot pay.
For the most part contributions are made to “ the church,” rather than 
to the individual religious practitioner, either during religious services (“the 
offertory” ), by tithing, by mail contributions, or several o f these. Different 
denominations have different procedures for the collection and distribution 
o f  these funds. Most commonly, both in the mainstream churches and in
Vthose sects and cults which have national bodies or leaders, the receipts 
from individual contributions by parishioners or members are apportioned 
between the local group in which they are collected and the national 
organization. Distributive decisions concern what proportion o f these funds 
should be used for, say, outreach or missionary work, what proportion for 
building maintenance and the establishment o f new local churches, what 
proportion for investments, and what proportion should be used for the 
salaries o f religious practitioners: in some groups, this is determined locally, 
in others, it is set by policies o f the national organization. In some groups, 
the financial status o f the organization and, with it, the individual practi­
tioner is wholly dependent on contributions, but even in an age in which 
many of the largest religious groups are using the investment tech­
niques of secular business to protect and augment their assets, they are still 
dependent at least to some extent upon the contributions o f the rank-and- 
file. Numbers count, and the strength o f a church is often measured both in 
the volume o f its contributions and the size o f its membership rolls. It is the 
naive religious practitioner who is not mindful o f these, and the naive ap­
plied ethicist who fails to recognize the moral problems emerging here. In­
stitutional religion too includes an element of practitioner accountability 
similar to that in the secular professions: the physician must attract a steady 
supply of patients, the attorney must bring to the firm a substantial number 
of clients, and the religious practitioner too must be able to attract and keep 
a satisfied congregation. What moral rules one must keep or break in order 
to accomplish this provides still further opportunity for ethical reflection.
Finally, the role o f the religious practitioner in the community at large 
also bears strong resemblances to the roles o f other professionals. Not only 
is the religious practitioner—at least those from the mainline church­
es—publicly recognized in his role and accorded social status commen­
surate with other professionals (though this has been under fairly rapid 
change since the previous century, and the formerly elevated status o f the 
clergy has to some degree been eclipsed by gains in prestige of other profes­
sions, particularly medicine and science), but like other professionals the 
religious practitioner has an effective monopoly on the services he provides. 
This may not initially seem to be the case; indeed, in this respect religious 
practice may more nearly resemble the business world, where numerous 
competitors offer similar or identical services among which the customer 
roay take his pick. In the United States there are some 218 Christian church­
es3—not including an estimated 2000-3000 cults and sects— from which 
the prospective believer can choose. Quite high levels o f shifts in denomina­
tional preferences (especially characteristic o f the mainline Protestant 
groups4) may seem to reinforce this commercialist model: the religious
APPLIED ETHICS AND INSTITUTIONAL RELIGION 573
574 i  V M ARGARET PABST BATTIN
customer can always shop around. But this is to overlook the inherently 
monopolistic character o f the religious profession per se: within a given 
denomination, the practitioners do have a monopoly on the provision of 
services o f that sort. Thus, Catholic priests have a monopoly on the provi­
sion o f Catholic religious services: one can take communion from or be 
married by any one o f a number o f Catholic priests, but one cannot get a 
Catholic marriage or a Catholic communion from practitioners outside this 
institution. Viewed in this light, institutional religious practice, despite its 
diversity, is essentially monopolistic in character. If the client seeks religious 
services of a denominationally specific sort, he cannot shop around. This 
fact too has important moral consequences, particularly in the occasions for 
control it presents.
Thus, we see that the provision o f religious services shares many com­
mon, central features with the secular professional fields. O f course, this 
may not be all there is to religious practice, and the devout believer may find 
our deliberately sociological account of the clergy as “ religious 
practitioners” and as “ providers o f religious services” inadequate to 
describe what really goes on in religious practice.5 But regardless of the 
significance a community o f believers may attach to the practices and struc­
tures within which they express their faith, these structures and practices do 
resemble those o f the secular professions in important external ways, and 
thus at least in external ways can be addressed in the same terms and with 
the same conceptual apparatus as the secular professions. This is just to say 
that, at least to some extent, religious practices and structures are quite 
naturally subject to evaluation which does not depend on the beliefs of the 
people within the system, but on the common general body o f moral reason­
ing which we also apply to other areas o f human interaction.
If we undertake the general examination o f institutional religious prac­
tice with the apparatus o f applied professional ethics—that body of ethical 
thought, rooted in utilitarianism and Kantian deontology, which appeals to 
principles like beneficence, autonomy, and justice—we shall, I think, find 
that the institutional provision o f religious services presents inherent, pro­
found moral difficulties and dilemmas—whatever the denomination or 
group. It is the resolution o f these difficulties and dilemmas which may be 
less satisfactory in some groups, more satisfactory from a moral point of 
view in others. For instance, the practice o f confession presents dilemmas in 
confidentiality, whether in a Catholic church or in a fundamentalist sect, 
though these groups may resolve the problem in.quite different ways. The 
practice o f baptism poses dilemmas in consent and second-party consent, 
regardless o f the specific ritual o f the practice; and the attempt to pr°s' 
elytize, at least where the missionary seeks to convert the nonbeliever far
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his own good, presents acute problems in paternalism—in every sect or 
denomination. Since even in a politically secular society organized religion 
remains a major force, directly affecting that proportion of the population 
who regularly attend churches (in 1981, 41 % of the population o f the 
United States claimed to do so in a typical week6) and indirectly affecting 
the entire society, we cannot simply ignore what may be some of the most 
pressing problems in professional ethics for contemporary society 
altogether.
It is often said that religion is the source o f ethics; as an historical 
point, this is largely true. But this does not entail that religious practice is 
immune to examination with the secular descendents o f a religiously- 
originated tradition, whether these descendents are utilitarian or deon- 
tological in character, or that secular ethical analysis cannot properly ac­
commodate distinctively religious concerns. Religious practice is tradi­
tionally regarded as separate from secular life and hence to large extent 
screened o ff or protected from ordinary ethical scrutiny; thus, it will mark 
an advance if we can come to see that many o f the problems institutional 
religion presents are very much like the problems which arise in secular pro­
fessional fields, and that consequently they are subject—without injustice 
to religious faith—to similar secular ethical analysis and critique.
Methodological Problem s
But there may be serious methodological obstacles to the scrutiny of 
religious practice with the apparatus of applied professional ethics, even if 
we grant that the provision of religious services is indeed a profession. 
These are methodological obstacles which do not arise in the other, secular 
professions, though they have to do with the sorts of claims and assertions 
which can appear in arguments concerning the morality of professional 
practices; religious practice presents methodological problems which seem 
to be unique.
Ordinary moral arguments include among their premises two kinds o f  
claims, statements o f fact and assertions o f moral principle and rule, 
together with assertions derivable from conjunctions o f these claims. Asser­
tions of moral principle and rule are themselves grounded in appeal to 
nioral theory itself. Which moral theories are admitted as bases for asser­
tions in specific moral arguments of course fires much o f the discussion in 
applied ethics, and the disputes between supporters o f the various major 
camps—utilitarians, Kantians and other deontologists, modern Kantians 
and libertarians, divine-command and natural-law theorists, and so 
°n—render fertile and lively much o f the discussion in contemporary ap­
plied ethics.
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Applied professional ethics adds the further claim that certain profes 
sional practices are, in the terminology o f Alan Goldman, "strongly role 
differentiated” —that is, they are defended by appeal to the special goals, 
norms, and roles o f the profession, which outweigh or override ordinary 
moral considerations. Thus, certain departures from ordinary moral rules 
may be morally permitted or required (e.g ., the physician’s withholding a 
dismal diagnosis from a patient, the attorney’s refusing to reveal to a court 
information damaging to his client, the engineer’s calculating in monetary 
terms the costs o f human lives vs. construction expenses), even though such 
departures apparently cannot be defended on ordinary utilitarian and deon- 
tological grounds.7 Nevertheless, these practices are ultimately defended on 
the grounds that the institution itself, o f which they are a necessary part, 
serves a vital moral function in society, and establishing this, in turn, re­
quires appeal to the same basic moral grounds, hence, even assertions of 
strongly differentiated professional principles or rules are ultimately of a 
kind with other moral principles and rules; they do not represent a new kind 
o f datum in the moral argument.
However, the discussion o f issues in the profession o f religious practice 
must contend with an additional kind o f assertion, which is neither a state­
ment of fact nor an assertion o f moral principle or rule. It does not im­
mediately require independent justification, but nevertheless claims 
privileged status in moral argumentation.8 This additional kind of datum is 
doctrine, and it is assigning the correct logical status in moral argumenta­
tion to assertions o f doctrine that I see as the central methodological prob­
lem in addressing moral issues in the professional practice o f religion. In 
what follows, I shall pursue a single, extended sample—the issue of confes­
sional confidentiality—to display both what the methodological problem is 
and how I think it can be resolved.
Much o f the practice o f  religious professionals is doctrine-controlled. 
The practitioner is directed to do what he does—preaching, baptizing, hear­
ing confessions, exacting the promises o f marriage, inculcating religious 
belief in children, making converts, etc.—by the fundamental texts, 
teachings, doctrines, and semi-doctrinal regulations o f his group. Attitudes 
and practices concerning the more general principles o f autonomy, con­
sent, paternalism, beneficence, and so on are also dictated in this way. But 
the fact that specific practices and general stances are doctrine-dictated is 
often taken to preclude any further moral discussion: it is the practitioner s 
obligation, it is often held, to obey the directives he is given as an adherent 
and protector o f  the faith by the scriptures, laws, and policies of his group. 
For instance, to attend to the particular example we shall be examining, 
dilem m as o f confidentiality are said not to confront the Catholic priest in
the way that they confront physicians or lawyers. Rather, the priest is 
bound by Catholic doctrine—specifically by canons 889 and 890, which 
prohibit him from ever breaking the seal of confession even though he is 
not absolutely bound to keep secrets acquired in nonconfessional contexts.9 
Since the canon law’s prohibition o f disclosure o f confessional secrets is ab-
• solute and since it is to be held de fid e , it is claimed, there simply is no fur­
ther issue: it is clear what the Catholic priest, qua Catholic priest, must do. 
Considerations which might weigh in other professional contexts—say, 
ssible harms to innocent third parties, unrectified past harms, violations 
of the law, damage to important social institutions, or prospective harms to 
the confessor or to the confessant—carry no weight here, for the doctrinal 
requirement is perfectly clear and perfectly absolute. The confessant may be
tplanning a murder, harboring knowledge which would exonerate someone unjustly convicted of a crime, evading the law, or planning to kill the priest himself. Under the policies generally accepted and defended in other profes­sions— for instance, medicine, law, and, after Tarasoff, in psychiatry—some 
or all of these circumstances would warrant breaking promises or expecta­
tions o f confidentiality. But, under Catholic doctrine, there are no cir­
cumstances in which a confessional secret, once the seal o f confession has 
been given, may be revealed.
This may seem to block all moral discussion at all, for if we simply ac­
cept these doctrinal claims at face value there is nothing to discuss, and if we 
reject them because they are doctrinal the edifice of religion crumbles. It is 
of course possible to critique religious practice in purely secular ways, asser­
ting that religious doctrine is without significant content and that religious 
practice must be viewed as the spectacle o f some persons spreading empty 
claims among others, encouraging or forcing them to engage in self- 
depriving behaviors which have no intrinsic merit. Doctrinal assertions 
about such entities as God, heaven, hell, sin, repentance, forgiveness, salva­
tion, and the like are, on this view, all without reference, and have no place 
in moral argumentation. But although such critique is possible (and on 
metaphysical grounds may well be correct), I do not think it promotes either 
the most interesting or the most informative kind of moral analysis o f  
religious practice. More revealing is an analysis which acknowledges 
religion’s background, fundamental metaphysical claims, but still directly, 
unflinchingly addresses the moral issues posed by the practices religion pur­
sues.
But if so, what specific status do we assign in moral argumentation to 
items of doctrine? What role, for example, should we assign to canons 889 
and 890, which forbid the Catholic priest to reveal a confession in any cir­
cumstances at all, regardless of other moral principles or consequences?
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Let us begin by examining such items o f doctrine with reference to the 
institutional structures and practices from which they originate or within 
which they have developed; this is to examine them historically. If we trace 
their history, we find a continuing developmental process from the earliest 
period o f church history to the church’s present position. This history will 
provide a basis for assigning particular doctrinal assertions specific statuses 
in moral argumentation.
The biblical texts James 5:16, M atthew  16:19, and John 20:23 are con­
sidered within the Christian tradition to provide a scriptural basis for the 
practice o f confession. However, the precise nature o f this mandate is far 
from clear, and it is by no means evident precisely what kind or kinds of 
practice it directs. Jam es, the most straightforward o f these texts, simply 
directs, ‘Therefore confess your sins to one an oth er/’ but does not specify 
whether this shall be done privately or openly, singly or in groups, nor does 
it say how explicit the confession shall be, or what the hearer or hearers 
shall do with the information received. (Similar foundational doctrinal 
assertions could be identified for other religious practices, including bap­
tism, preaching, marriage, proselytizing, etc.)
Once the initial doctrine mandate is identified, however vague it may 
be, we then turn to the historical ways in which it has been interpreted 
within a given religious group. Relatively little is certain about the actual 
practice o f confession in the earliest days o f the Christian church; while it 
has long been believed that the earliest forms o f Christian confession were 
public, and that the individual recited his sins before the assembled church 
community, some scholars now hold that the act o f confession may have 
been predominantly private. Nevertheless, the acts o f satisfaction—the 
evidences o f one’s status as a penitent—were clearly public: the individual 
wore a spcial penitential robe, the cilicium ; he stood in a restricted area of 
the church, among the ranks o f public penitents; and he did not participate 
in the sacrament. From these facts, o f course, others could infer something 
of the nature and gravity o f his sins. Strict continence was required; he 
could not marry, nor participate in military service or most forms of com­
mercial activity. The period o f penance lasted as much as several years (or 
more, during the era o f  Tertullian and Cyprian), and an individual was per­
mitted to undergo it only once; if he repeated the infraction, he was exclud­
ed from the church.10
To what degree the details o f confessions were also made public is not 
clear. However, a letter of Leo I, written in 459, provides evidence that 
some penitents were compelled to read in public an explicit list o f persona 
sins; Leo rejects this practice as an abuse.11 Some sources claim that Leo in­
stituted private confession initially for priests and deacons in order to pf°
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tect the church from the scandal that would otherwise arise, and that this 
practice was thereafter extended to the laity. More probably, it ws the Celtic 
monks of the 6th century who introduced the new mode o f penance, incor­
porating both secret confession to the priest and reconciliation without 
public penance, defamation, or legal consequences: one’s sins became a 
private matter, not for public display.12 Some o f the more fanciful ac­
counts, often from later antipapist sources, claim that with the establish­
ment o f private auricular confession, personal abuses of penitents by priests 
became rampant, particularly for female penitents.13 Indeed, some claim 
that the confessional booth was introduced (in Spain) in order to prevent 
such abuses: it prevented the confessor and penitent from direct vision and, 
more importantly, from touching. Whatever the details o f its origin, 
however, the'booth also provided, for the first time, virtual anonymity for 
the penitent (though he could still be seen entering and leaving the booth) 
and complete privacy for the act o f confession. With this, the possibility o f  
full confidentiality arose, as well as the possibility o f violating confidentiali­
ty in circumstances which might seem to promise it. By the time o f the 
Council o f Trent (1551), the position particulated in canons 889 and 890, 
assuring complete confidentiality in all matters o f confession, had been 
established, and has remained unchanged since.
Not all religious groups which treat Jam es, M atthew  and John as scrip­
tural have developed private confessional practices. In some (particularly 
among fundamentalist groups), direct public confession is encouraged or 
required, and is not preceded by any form of private confession; here no 
guarantees of confidentiality are given or expectations of confidentiality 
raised: confession is made in front o f the entire assembly. Other denomina­
tions, including most o f mainline Protestantism, hold that confession can 
be made only directly by the confessant to the deity; these groups recognize 
no institutional practice o f confession at all, and their closest approach is in 
pastoral counseling. In some groups, confession is purely formal: it involves 
reciting a general acknowledgment o f sins, but includes no specific descrip­
tion o f them. And in some groups, especially among the cults or new 
religions, we find what is probably best described as forced confession, 
where issues of confidentialty are entirely beside the point: while the cir­
cumstances are sometimes private, no guarantees of confidentiality are 
given or understood. But o f those groups which have developed p riva te  con­
fessional practice, all have faced the same ethical dilemma: what ought the 
religious professional do when revelation o f the confessed material, ob­
tained in private under expectations o f confidentiality, would relieve or pre­
vent serious harms to other persons or institutions? Differing groups answer 
this question in quite different ways. While the Catholics prohibit any
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release, the Mormons, for example, permit and in some cases require 
divulging o f confessional material to a church court, even when it is ob­
tained in private.14 These two groups, both taking the same initial texts as 
scriptural, have developed opposite answers to the moral problem 
adherence to those texts raises.
Surveying the developmental history o f confessional practices, 
however fragmentary the specific details may be, we are able to articulate a 
general methodological principle governing the study of ethical issues in 
religious practice. Once we see that a practice precedes the doctrinal solu­
tion which is put forth to resolve the ethical problem the practice itself 
raises, we are able to differentiate those doctrines or recognized policies 
which develop in response to an institutional practice from those which 
antecedently mandate that practice. The problem o f confidentiality is not 
associated with religious confession per se , nor is it a direct consequence of 
the fundamental scriptural mandate to confess. Rather, the problem of con­
fidentiality begins to arise only with the development of auricular confes­
sional practices in which confession is made individually, in a private set­
ting, without public evidence o f penitent status; it is compounded when 
confession is made to a religious professional, rather than simply to another 
member of the group. The issue o f confidentiality does not present itself 
with full force until after confession and satisfaction have become both 
wholly private and wholly professionalized. Hence, the doctrinal assertion 
that confidentiality must never be broken must be regarded in a quite dif­
ferent way from the doctrinal assertion mandating confession itself. The 
assertion requiring confidentiality represents a conclusion or answer to the 
moral problem which the practice o f private auricular confession itself 
raises, not a premise in the moral argument concerning it.
This account may provide a general mechanism for treating doctrinal 
claims concerning a wide variety of religious practices. The essential point is 
that the logical status o f a doctrinal assertion in moral argumentation is not 
invariant; it is relative to the practice with which it is associated, and to the 
problem it serves to resolve. Unlike matters of fact and assertions of moral 
principle and rule, doctrinal assertions cannot all be accorded the same 
status in moral argumentation; while some may function as premises, others 
cannot.
To determine what status a given doctrinal claim should be accorded, 
we must examine not only the basic texts, teachings, and pronouncements 
of the group, but the history o f the development of these doctrines. First, 
we can identify those articles o f doctrine which originally mandate certain 
kinds o f  actions, or prohibit certain kinds of actions; these may be called 
basic or 0-level doctrines, to suggest that they incorporate the fundamental
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general directives of the faith, such as chastity, baptism, confession, 
monogamous marriage, charity, proselytism, and so on. These fundamental 
general mandates are often to be located in scriptural commandments, 
though many scriptural passages do not yield fundamental general man­
dates in this sense, and many fundamental general mandates are derived 
from sources other than scripture. Sometimes, such mandates are pro­
nounced by prophets or sages within a tradition; sometimes they are ar­
ticulated by later theologians or scholars examining the roots of a tradition; 
and sometimes they are nowhere stated explicitly, but must be inferred from 
peripheral, established doctrines, much as the constitutional right of  
privacy has been identified by the Supreme Court in the “ penumbra” of the 
Bill o f Rights. Most frequently, though, such mandates are to be found in 
scripture.
When a fundamental mandate o f this sort is recognized by a religious 
group, the group then typically develops an institutional mechanism for 
eliciting and regulating the required action: it specifies how the fundamental 
general mandate is to be put into practice. This mechanism is encoded in 
what may be called first-order doctrine. The mechanism itself may develop 
and evolve over time, as the institutional practices of baptism and confes­
sion do, or it may be adopted in a relatively sudden way, as for instance when 
a church leader institutes a ruling. (Examples of the latter, often said to be 
based on visions or revelations, might include Mother Ann’s prohibition o f  
sexual activity to the Shakers, Joseph Smith’s introduction of polygamy to 
the Mormons, or Sun Myung M oon’s performing mass marriage in his 
Unification Church.) In both cases, nevertheless, it is the institutional 
mechanism itself—the practice—which brings with it characteristic moral 
problems, particularly when the practice is conducted and enforced by the 
professionals o f the group. It is these problems which demand resolution. 
For instance, the doctrinally mandated institution o f marriage, whether 
practiced in group, polygamous, or monogamous forms, gives rise to moral 
issues in contract and promise-keeping, which are accentuated as religious 
professionals admit or withhold marriage rites and extract specific marriage 
promises. Similarly, admission to monastic orders gives rise to issues of in­
formed consent; and the practice o f discipline, in forms such as penance or 
excommunication, gives rise to issues concerning the nature and purpose of 
Punishment generally.
As such problems become increasingly frequent and acute in the 
Srowth of a religious group, the group then develops policies which serve as 
“answers” or solutions to them. These solutions are then in turn typically 
also codified in doctrine or church law. For instance, as an answer to the 
Problems of promise-keeping and contract-making arising within
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monogamous marriage, some groups have come to view the commitment a 
irrevocably binding, regardless of changing circumstances and o f the desire: 
of the parties involved, and doctrinal policies prohibiting divorce and/oi 
remarriage have emerged. Other groups, reaching a different solution to th( 
same underlying problem, do not view the commitment as irrevocable, anc 
while observing the same institution o f monogamous marriage, permit it tc 
be dissolved. Similarly, facing the potential for coercive manipulatior 
which, given severe need on the part of the recipients, the doctrinal im­
perative o f giving charity poses, some groups repudiate simultaneous pros- 
elytism, while other groups do not, or work to ensure that receipt of chari­
ty is not conditional upon embracing the faith. Still other groups resolve the 
issue in the opposite way, and extend charity only to members or prospec­
tive members o f their own group.
In all these cases, what is o f interest to the contemporary ethicist, par­
ticularly to those familiar with the ethical issues which arise in other profes­
sional areas, are the “ answers” or conclusions which have been developed 
to resolve institutionally generated moral problems, particularly as they 
regulate the activities o f religious practitioners. We shall call these policies 
“ second-order” doctrines to emphasize their different logical status; they 
are neither the primary requirements of the religious tradition nor the initial 
institutional directives, but serve rather to provide strategies for resolving 
the problems which those primary requirements and directives raise. But 
since they develop in order to resolve moral dilemmas, as ethicists we can­
not give them privileged status in the moral argument, regardless of the 
status the religious tradition itself assigns them. To do so would be to beg 
the question the practice in question raises, not to reach a solution to it. 
Rather, as ethicists, we must consider whether these second-order doctrines 
could provide an adequate solution to the problems with which they are 
associated, and attempt to show why or why not. Thus, it cannot be held, at 
least morally speaking, that the Catholic priest ought never violate the con­
fidentiality o f the confessional because canons 889 and 890 forbid him to do 
so. Rather, since the ethical problem both historically and logically precedes 
the development o f doctrinal answers to it, the applied professional ethicist 
concerned with the practice o f religion must address the moral issue of con­
fidentiality directly, without question-begging doctrinal appeal. Of course, 
the primary directives and doctrinal imperatives could also be subjected to 
ethical critique; but to do so is to question the profession altogether, not to 
address the inherent moral problems it generates. (One could of course 
question the foundations and legitimacy o f the profession of religion 
altogether, as one may question the foundations and legitimacy, say, of the 
professions o f psychiatry or business, but that is to exceed too soon the
[ A PPLIED  ETHICS AND INSTITUTIONAL RELIGION 583imits of normative examination o f institutional practices and policies so productive and informative in contemporary professional ethics. In applied 
professional ethics, we begin by fingering the tendrils, not chopping down 
the tree.)
But the analysis must be still more complex, for we may find still fur­
ther elements o f doctrine which bear on the behavior o f religious profes­
sionals. For instance, to return to our example, although we may succeed in 
distinguishing the basic-level doctrinal mandate to confess, the first-order, 
evolved doctrines stipulating a mechanism o f private, auricular confession  
to a religious professional, and the second-order doctrines encoded in 
canons 889 and 890 requiring strict confidentiality, we may discover still 
further teachings, doctrines, and regulations which have bearing on this 
issue. For instance, the priest who has knowledge from confession o f a per­
son’s activities and who is compelled to testify in a court of law 15 is re­
quired, under second-order doctrine, not to reveal this knowledge, and thus 
must deny (even under oath on the Bible) any knowledge o f them .16 This 
may seem to involve both deliberate falsehood—lying—and violation o f the 
law. Further, the priest is forbidden from intervening to prevent serious 
harms (say, a murder), even when he could easily and without risk do so, if 
this would require the revelation o f confessional material; this would seem 
to violate duties to others. But these apparent breaches o f moral principle 
are explained by the further doctrinal claim that the priest holds confes­
sional knowledge “ in G od” or “ as G od ,” and does not know it in the or­
dinary sense at a ll.17 Thus he is said not to be morally complicit in any 
crime, even though he may appear to allow it to occur, nor to violate the 
law, nor to be morally responsible for lying.
This defense, however, we may recognize as itself another higher-order 
doctrine which has developed to resolve the ethical issues attendant upon a 
doctrinally-mandated practice: it too seems to announce itself as an 
“answer.” Similarly, it too is an evolved response to the disturbing moral 
questions the practice o f private confession raises. However, it is in an im­
portant way different from second-order doctrines: it does not simply dic­
tate a policy requiring a specific course o f action with respect to the problem 
at hand, but serves to excuse the residual objections which the adoption o f a 
specific second-order doctrine had raised.
O f course, not only policies but excuses too are o f interest to the ap­
plied ethicist. Insofar as the priest is capable o f repeating the confession and 
understanding its meaning, he does know it (that is, he knows what the con­
fessant has said, not that the confession is true), and cannot so easily elude 
moral critique. To claim that the priest cannot tell the truth or prevent a 
harm because he does not know the confessed information attempts to ex­
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cuse him from moral expectations which may be very strong, and the ap­
plied ethicist will want to consider whether such an excuse is adequate. Like 
second-order doctrines which function as answers, third-order doctrines 
which function as excuses also cannot be accorded privileged status among 
the premises in the general moral argument concerning confidentiality 
without producing circularity, and it does not settle the issue to say that the 
priest cannot act or tell because he does not know. He does know, and the 
moral questions which confront him and those examining the practice of 
religion are these: Should he act? Should he tell? These are precisely the 
sorts o f questions confronting practitioners in the other, secular profes­
sions, and simple appeal to second and third-order religious doctrines can­
not protect the religious professional from similar moral critique.
On R elated Problem s
‘ Conducting this sort o f critique may also encourage us to reinspect 
those areas o f applied professional ethics with which we are already 
familiar. Discovering that an applied ethics of religious practice is obliged 
to contend with a new kind o f premise in addition to assertions o f fact and 
assertions of moral principle and rule, we may begin to wonder whether 
there are analogous features in, for instance, medicine, engineering, educa­
tion, or law. One might, for instance, suggest that intuitionist claims made 
by doctors about “ experience” or “ expertise” are not simply claims based 
in assertions o f  fact (as, for instance, empirical evidence from a large series 
of cases) perhaps together with assertions o f moral principle or rule, but 
rather function in a way similar to claims made by religious practitioners 
about doctrine, an analogy perhaps inviting because these claims are often 
asserted with similar fervor. In law, one might wonder whether appeal to 
precedent should be assigned logical status similar to that o f doctrine: if so, 
we would expect to recognize varying degrees o f authoritativeness, such that 
while some precedent can serve, at least initially, as premise in a moral argu­
ment, other derivative or interpretive decisions, though perhaps occupying 
similar status in the law, cannot.
We may also want to point out that the critical program described here 
is in a substantial sense incomplete. In other areas of applied professional 
ethics the analysis o f moral dilemmas at the levels which confront practi­
tioners often reveals inconsistencies, or seeming inconsistencies, in the more 
central, underlying mandates within the field. In medicine, for instance, 
analysis o f practical dilemmas in care-giving may reveal conflict between 
the fundamental mandates to relieve suffering and to prolong life, as similar 
analysis in law may reveal friction between obligations to defend the ac­
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cused and to seek justice.18 If these foundational mandates are not merely 
simple matters o f  fact or claims about moral principle and rule, nor asser­
tions derivable from a conjunction o f such claims, we may ask whether they 
play roles in moral argumentation much like assertions o f 0-level doctrine, 
as the basic, fundamental mandates o f a tradition not immediately requir- 
i ing independent moral justification. Yet the hard cases at the practical level 
,■ force us to recognize friction among these fundamental mandates. Thus, we 
may perhaps expect the hard cases in institutional religious practice to 
reveal this sort o f friction too: for instance, doctrinal mandates to respect 
free will may turn out to conflict with those encouraging the promotion o f  
salvation, at least when challenged by hard cases involving belief- 
engendering paternalism in missionary practices designed to gain converts. 
Such conflict could presumably be resolved only by fundamental clarifica­
tion o f  the concepts involved or by doctrinal revision, though it need not in­
volve wholesale rejection o f doctrine altogether. (The applied ethicist can 
not only finger the tendrils, so to speak, but disentangle or even prune the 
branches, still without chopping down the tree.) Fundamental clarification 
and doctrinal revision would o f  course be the proper work o f the 
[theologian, not the applied ethicist; but it is the issues raised by the ethicist 
which necessitate the theologian’s work. At the prodding o f the ethicist 
foundational criticism and analysis is already occurring in medicine, law, 
and the other professions; we may well expect similar consequences from 
professional-ethics scrutiny o f  institutional religion too.
In all o f  this, however, a crucial methodological point must remain 
clear. It is not the beliefs o f the religious group which determine the logical 
status o f  a doctrinal requirement in moral argumentation, any more than 
rdoctor’s beliefs determine right behavior in medical practice, though the 
B eliefs o f the religious group do determine a requirement’s status as doc- 
B pne. It is the ethicist examining a religious tradition who must differentiate 
basic mandates—often though not always found in scripture—from first- 
order directives putting that mandate into practice, second-order strategies 
for resolving moral problems, and third-order excuses for the strategies 
adopted. This may require not only familiarity with the historical tradition 
and respect for the central commitments o f  a group, but the kind o f good 
moral ear which can distinguish mandate from strategy from excuse, in 
whatever contexts they may appear. To the believer, assertions at all these 
fcvels may hold equal status as doctrine, and a kind o f “ sacred mantle” 
may seem to fall equally over all; to the ethical analyst this mantle must be 
Bjfted, though not destroyed, in order to recognize the very real problems 
beneath.
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On Future Problems ^  r
If we now see that the provision o f religious services resembles the 
secular professions, and if furthermore we have removed a principal 
obstacle to addressing this area with the critical apparatus o f applied profes­
sional ethics, we may wish to consider what sorts o f  specific problems might 
be addressed. I’ve tried to suggest some o f them; an exhaustive survey 
would be immense. But there is a further, fundamental problem, which will 
return us to the issues with which we began.
Among the characterizations o f the professions there remains one 
crucial feature, universally counted among the necessary features of both 
the scholarly and the consulting professions, which is however most con­
troversial when applied in the religious context. The professions, it is held, 
provide an important service, one which is crucial to the functioning of 
society as a w hole.19 Furthermore, it is the very importance o f this service 
which excuses ethical violations made in its name. Violations o f  ordinary 
morality— for instance, lying, or failing to prevent easily preventable 
serious harms—will be acceptable just if they are necessary to enable the 
practitioner to perform his or her central function, and those institutional 
practices will be favored which are maximally effective in providing the pro­
fession’s services with minimal violation o f ordinary moral rules. But if this 
is so, then we must ask what are the basic services conveyed in religious 
practice—presumably accomplished in such specific activities as baptism, 
confession, preaching, proselytism, and the like— , and are these services 
important ones? I shall hardly propose to answer these questions here. But I 
think we must keep in mind that these questions, though perhaps relatively 
easily answered in the secular professions, may prove much more difficult 
here. However, I do not think that the difficulty o f  answering them shows 
religious practice not to be a profession, or shows it to be one not accessible 
to the methods o f contemporary professional-ethics critique. Rather, I 
think this shows the profession o f religion to present a much more compel­
ling, important problem. As a society, we are lavish consumers of religious 
services, as we are o f services in medicine and in law, and we may wish to 
take some interest in the moral characteristics o f the way in which these ser­
vices are provided.
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NOTES
* Some of the material in this paper is drawn from my “Telling Confessions:
I Confidentiality in the Practice of Religion,” Sunstone, vol. 8, no. 6 (Nov. -  Dec. 
1983), and other parts are drawn from a book in progress, provisionally entitled 
Ethical Issues in the Practice o f  Religion. I’d like to thank a number of my collegues 
at Utah for vigorous discussion of these issues and for reading earlier drafts of this 
paper, including Virgil Aldrich, Peter Appleby, Mendel Cohen, Don Garrett, Bruce 
Landesman, Max Rogers, and Peter Windt.
1. See Clyde J. Steckel, “The Ministry as Profession and Calling,” W ord  <£ 
World, vol. 1, no. 4 (Fall, 1981), for an informative summary of these disputes.
2. In drawing these parallels, I shall be relying on Michael D. Bayles’s Profes­
sional Ethics (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1981), especially the first chapter.
3. This figure represents the number of U.S. religious bodies for which the Year­
book o f  Am erican and Canadian Churches, 1983, ed. Constant H. Jacquet, Jr. 
(Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1983) reports data; it does not include sects or 
cults.
4. Howard M. Bahr, “ Shifts in Denominational Demography,” Journal f o r  the 
| Scientific S tudy o f  Religion, vol. 21, no. 2, June 1982, p. 106 and passim.
5. Steckel’s paper, mentioned earlier, gives a good account of such shortcom­
ings.
6. Yearbook o f  American and Canadian Churches, 1983, p. 270.
7. Alan H. Goldman, The M oral Foundations o f  Professional Ethics (Totowa, 
NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1980), esp. the Introduction.
8. Similar assertions may be made of alleged direct divine command, as in vi­
sions, voices, intuitions, prickings of conscience, etc., though I shall not discuss
I them here.
9. For an extended account of the doctrine, see Rev. John R. Roos, The Seal o f  
Confession, The Catholic University of America Canon Law Studies No. 413 
(Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, I960), or, more succinctly, 
The Catholic Encyclopedia  s.v. “ Confession, Auricular,” and s.v. “ Confession, 
Seal of,” in any recent edition. For a discussion of circumstances outside confession 
where a professional or other secret may be revealed, see Robert E. Regan, Profes­
sional Secrecy in the L ight o f  M oral Principles (Washington, DC: Augustianian 
Press, 1943), esp. Chapter 12, “The Extra-sacramental Secret of the Priest.”
t 10. For an account of these practices, see R. C. Mortimer, The Origins o f  Private  
Penance in the Western Church (Oxford: Clarendon, 1939), drawing on the earlier 
work of O. D. Watkins and B. Poschman.
I 11. See The Catholic Encyclopedia, s.v. “ Confession, Auricular,” ed. 1967, vol. 
4, p. 132.
12. This development is traced in B. Poschman, Die Abendlaendische Kirchen- 
buesse im Ausgang des Christlichen A ltertum s (Munich, 1928), in English as 
Penance and the A nointing o f  the Sick, tr. and rev. F. Courtney (New York, 1964); 
see also Mortimer, nlO above, p. 3.
f  13. See, for instance, Count C. P. de Lasteyrie’s The H istory o f  Auricular Con­
fession (London: Richard Bentley, 1848), esp. vol. I, Chapter II, on “ Seduction of 
Women in Spain, by Means of Confession.”
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14. For documentation of these claims, see my “Telling Confessions: Confiden­
tiality in the Practice of Religion,” Sunstone, vol. 8, no. 6 (Nov. -  Dec. 1983), which 
examines confidentiality and confessional practices in Catholicism and Mormonism.
15. Unlike England, most of the states in the U.S. recognize the priest/penitent 
privilege, protecting the priest from being required to testify concerning matters 
learned in confession. In many states, this privilege is extended to communications 
to clergy which are not penitential in character, for instance, as in marriage counsel­
ing conducted by the clergy. However, in the U.S. the law varies widely from state to 
state. For an historical account of the development of English and American law, see 
Vincent C. Allred, “The Confessor in Court,” The Jurist, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 2-22 
(January 1953); and for more recent summaries of statues, Fred L. Kuhlmann, 
“ Communications to Clergymen—When Are They Privileged?” The Journal of 
Pastoral Care, vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 30-46 (1970); and Tiemann and Bush, The Right to 
Silence: Privileged Clergy Comm unication and the Law  (Nashville, TN: Abingdon 
Press, 1983).
16. See Roos, n9 above, p. 73.
17. See Roos, n9 above, p. 73: “ [the confessor] actually has no human or com­
municable knowledge about the information being sought/’ and The Catholic En­
cyclopedia, s.v. “ Confession, Seal of,” ed. 1967, vol. 4, p. 134.
18. I thank Peter Windt for reminding me of this point.
19. This is argued by most writers on the secular professions, but disputed by 
Steckel with respect to religion. Steckel writes (p. 378) . . while the clergy are con­
sistently judged to be very trustworthy in public opinion polls, there is no clear 
public need for ordained clergy which could compare with the need for physicians or 
lawyers.”
